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Abstract
We project the future accumulation of profiles belonging to deceased Facebook users. Our analysis suggests that a
minimum of 1.4 billion users will pass away before 2100 if Facebook ceases to attract new users as of 2018. If the
network continues expanding at current rates, however, this number will exceed 4.9 billion. In both cases, a majority of
the profiles will belong to non-Western users. In discussing our findings, we draw on the emerging scholarship on digital
preservation and stress the challenges arising from curating the profiles of the deceased. We argue that an exclusively
commercial approach to data preservation poses important ethical and political risks that demand urgent consideration.
We call for a scalable, sustainable, and dignified curation model that incorporates the interests of multiple stakeholders.
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We, the Party, control all records, and we control all
memories. Then we control the past, do we not?
(Orwell, 1949: 313)
Introduction
Internet users leave vast volumes of online data behind
when passing away, commonly referred to as digital
remains (Lingel, 2013). The phenomenon is gaining
increasing traction within the academic community
(Gotved, 2014). Scholars of law and related areas are
investigating new dilemmas arising from inheritance of
digital estates (Banta et al., 2015; Craig et al., 2013) and
issues of posthumous online privacy (Harbinja, 2014).
Sociologists and anthropologists are increasingly turn-
ing their gaze towards the new types of ‘para-social’
relationships (Sherlock, 2013), and the ‘continuing
bonds’ (Bell et al., 2015) that we shape with the
online dead. And in philosophy, there has been a
rising interest for the ontological (Steinhart, 2007;
Stokes, 2012; Swan and Howard, 2012) and ethical
(O¨hman and Floridi, 2018; Stokes, 2015) status of digi-
tal remains. In short, online death has rapidly become a
booming and diverse research area.
Despite this breadth of perspectives, few studies have
thus far explored the macroscopic and quantitative
aspects of online death. While research on philosoph-
ical micro- and meso-level aspects are illuminating, the
global spread of the phenomenon, as well as its future
development, remain uncertain. The absence of thor-
ough empirical investigation on the macro-level
makes it difficult to formulate a critical analysis of the
global impact of online death from either long and/or
short-term perspectives. This is problematic, not only
because researchers (including the authors of this
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study) often motivate the significance of the subject by
alluding to its presumed size and growth (Acker and
Brubaker, 2014: 10; Harbinja, 2014: 21; O¨hman and
Floridi, 2017: 640), but also because there is reason to
believe that online death will increase in significance as
more people around the world become connected and
mortality numbers rise. It is important to get the pic-
ture straight. Is social media, as occasionally claimed
(Ambrosino, 2015; Brown, 2016), turning into a ‘digital
graveyard’? If so, how is the phenomenon geographic-
ally distributed? And perhaps more importantly, what
ethical and political challenges would emerge from such
development? Despite the somewhat alarming nature of
these questions, there have hitherto been few attempts
to provide rigorous answers.
To address this lacuna and lay the groundwork for
further macroscopic analysis, the current study sets out
to estimate the growth of digital remains over the
course of the 21st century, using the world’s largest
platform – Facebook – as a case study. Facebook’s
policy on deceased users has changed somewhat over
the years, but the current approach is to allow next of
kin to either memorialize or permanently delete the
account of a confirmed deceased user (Facebook,
n.d.).1 The focus of this article, however, is not
merely on the memorialized profiles, but on all profiles
belonging to deceased users, be they memorialized or
not. We pose two research questions:
RQ1: How will the number of Facebook profiles
belonging to dead users develop over the course of
the 21st century?
RQ2: What will be the geographical distribution of
dead Facebook profiles?
Our analysis is conducted in two stages, henceforth
referred to as Scenarios A and B. In Scenario A, we
assume a global freeze on new users joining the network
as of 2018 and predict the resulting accumulation of
dead profiles for each nation in the world. This effect-
ively sets a ‘floor’ on the possible growth of dead pro-
files on the network. To carry out the analysis, we use a
public dataset of projected mortality from 2000 to 2100,
distributed by age group and nationality (United
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
2017). These data are matched with current Facebook
user totals, scraped from Facebook’s audience insights
application programming interface (API) for each
country and age group. This allows us to estimate the
number of Facebook users expected to die in any given
country-year. In Scenario B, we expand the analysis to
a hypothetical scenario for Facebook’s future growth,
assuming that the network will continue to grow at a
pace of 13% per year (Facebook, 2018) until it reaches
a penetration rate of 100% for each country-year-age
group. While unlikely, this estimate provides a ‘ceiling’
for the accumulation of dead profiles. In conjunction
with the ‘floor’ defined in Scenario A, this ceiling
defines the window within which we can expect the
true number of dead profiles to fall.
In concluding the study, we situate the findings
within the larger context of digital preservation
(Whitt, 2017). We raise concerns over the current dom-
inance of commercial data management, and warn that
it may limit future generations’ access to historical data.
We argue that profiles of the deceased are valuable in
ways that cannot be quantified in purely economic
terms, which is why we advocate an explicitly multi-
stakeholder approach. If data are preserved solely on
the basis of corporate profitability, we warn that non-
economic considerations – e.g., the ethical, religious,
scientific, and historical value of digital remains –
may be neglected. Our digital heritage is difficult to
measure in dollars and cents.
Data
Three types of data were used to carry out the analysis:
projected mortality over the 21st century, distributed
by age and nationality; projected population data
over the 21st century, also distributed by age and
nationality; and current Facebook user totals for each
age group and country.
Mortality rates were calculated based on UN data,
which provide the expected number of mortalities and
total populations for every country in the world
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, 2017). Numbers are available for each age
group – 0 to 100, divided into five-year intervals –
and all years from 2000 to 2100, likewise divided into
five-year intervals. The estimates are based on official
data from each country’s government, and in some
cases external sources (esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/
DataSources/). It is unclear from the data how preci-
sion varies by country and year. All projections are
reported as point estimates, with no standard errors
or confidence intervals. For a more detailed account
of the UN data, see esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.
Facebook data were scraped from the company’s
Audience Insights page (facebook.com/ads/audience-
insights/) using a custom Python script that extracts
Facebook’s active monthly users by country and age.
These estimates are based on the self-reported age of
users. Facebook provides lower and upper bounds for
user totals across all ages and nationalities. For exam-
ple, there are between 15 and 20 million 25-year-old
Indians on the network.2 Variability increases with
user counts, both of which are reported in round num-
bers divisible by 5 or 10, suggesting that they are not
meant as serious estimates of standard errors or
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confidence intervals. We take the midpoint of each
country-age window for our analysis.
Facebook’s audience insights API provides by far
the most comprehensive publicly available estimate of
the network’s size and distribution. Nevertheless, we
wish to draw attention to several limitations of this
dataset. First, there are reasonable doubts about the
accuracy of Facebook’s reported monthly active
users. The site has recently been sued for allegedly
inflating these numbers with the intent of overcharging
advertisers (Todd, 2018), and Facebook explicitly notes
that their estimates are not meant to be matched with
population data. In addition to these concerns about
false positives, we also expect false negatives due to
users visiting the site less than once a month.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to say exactly how this
affects results without more fine-grained detail on the
distribution of errors. Second, the data exclude users
under 18, preventing us from evaluating network activ-
ity among 13–17 year olds (Facebook requires all users
to be at least 13). Due to the relatively low (although
varied) mortality rate of this age group, the missing
data should not have much impact on the projection
until relatively late in the century. Third, users aged
65þ are all put into the same age category. This gives
us less detailed data on penetration rates among the
elderly. But as we show in the following section, this
problem can be mitigated by extrapolating from a
smooth curve fit to data from younger users.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that our model is
devoted to the future development of death on
Facebook, and therefore leaves out users who have
already died and left profiles behind. Estimating the
current number of dead profiles would require histor-
ical data on the age distribution of Facebook users in
various countries, which are currently inaccessible
through the site’s API. Furthermore, the aim of the
study is to depict a larger, long-term trend, in which
the current numbers play only an illustrative role.
Methodology
Our methodological approach can be summarized by
the following procedure for each country:
1. estimate a function f mapping age and year to
expected mortality rates (see Figure 1(a));
2. estimate a function g mapping age to expected active
monthly Facebook users (see Figure 1(b));
3. extend g across time under two alternative scenarios
(details below);
4. multiply the outputs of f and g to estimate the
number of Facebook profiles belonging to dead
users of a given age in a given year (see
Figure 1(c)); and
5. integrate this product across all age groups to esti-
mate the number of dead profiles in a given year.
This pipeline is repeated for each country to get a
global estimate. Projections are integrated over several
years to get national or global estimates over time.
It should be noted that this approach makes a sub-
stantive and potentially problematic assumption,
namely that each country’s Facebook users constitute
a representative sample of the population, at least with
respect to mortality rates. It is well established that
internet usage, especially in developing economies, is
strongly correlated with education and income (PEW
Research Centre, 2018: 15). These two variables are in
turn correlated with life expectancy, which means there
is reason to believe that current Facebook users will live
slightly longer than non-users on average. Our model
does not account for this potential bias, which may
result in an overestimation of dead users in developing
countries.
However, a recent PEW research report (2018: 15)
indicates that the divide is rapidly shrinking. Between
2015 and 2017, social media penetration in countries
such as Lebanon, Jordan and the Philippines rose by
more than 20 percentage points, suggesting that con-
nectivity is fast becoming increasingly accessible. This
trend is expected to continue throughout the 21st cen-
tury, mitigating any potential confounding effects on
projections years or decades out. Furthermore, the
closer we get to full market saturation, the smaller the
bias becomes since people with high and low life expec-
tancies are both joining the network in large numbers.
In the face of this, it is important to stress that the value
of the present study lies in the larger trends it identifies,
not in the details of the immediate future development.
This should be kept in mind when assessing very short-
term scenarios.
The model described in step (2) was trained on 2018
data. We vary projections for future Facebook growth
according to two scenarios: (A) Shrinking. No new
users join the network. All current users remain until
their death. (B) Growing. The network grows at 13%
per year across all markets until usership reaches 100%.
To help extrapolate beyond the age of 64, the final age
for which Facebook provides monthly active user
totals, we anchored all regressions with an extra data
point of zero users aged 100. This is almost certainly
true in all markets, at least to a first approximation.
Alternative anchor points may be justified, but do not
have a major impact on results.
All statistical analysis was conducted in R, version
3.5.1 (R Core Team, 2018). Predictive functions were
estimated using generalized additive models (GAMs),
which provide a remarkably flexible framework for
learning nonlinear smooths under a wide range of
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settings (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990). Regressions were
implemented using the mgcv package (Wood, 2017).
A supplemental methods section, including data and
code for reproducing all figures and results, can be
found online at: https://github.com/dswatson/digital_
graveyard.
We fit three separate models for each country
Mortality Rate ¼ fC Time,Ageð Þ
FB Users 2018 ¼ gC Time ¼ 2018,Ageð Þ
Population ¼ hC Time,Ageð Þ
The subscript C indicates that each model is coun-
try-specific. We omit the subscript for notational con-
venience moving forward.
The mortality and population models provide non-
linear interpolations so that we can make predictions
for any age-year in the data without the limitations
imposed by the UN’s binning strategy.
Under Scenario A, we extrapolate model g beyond
2018 by assuming that no new users join Facebook and
current users leave the network if and only if they die.
This means we see zero 18-year-olds on the network in
2019, zero 18- or 19-year-olds in 2020, and so on.
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Figure 1. The analysis pipeline under Scenario A for India 2030. (a) Mortality rate is modelled as a function of age. (b) Facebook user
totals as a function of age. (c) Predicted values for both functions are multiplied to estimate the number of dead Indian users. The area
under this curve is our projected number of Indians on Facebook who will die in 2030.
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Attrition from current users can be calculated recur-
sively. For each year t and age a:
Scenario A
FB Users ¼ g Time ¼ t, Age ¼ að Þ ¼
g Time ¼ t 1,Age ¼ a 1ð Þ
 1 f Time ¼ t 1,Age ¼ a 1ð Þð Þ
In Scenario B, we extrapolate beyond g by assuming
that Facebook will see constant growth of 13% per
year in all markets until reaching a cap of 100% pene-
tration. For each year t and age a:
Scenario B
upper bound ¼ h Time ¼ t, Age ¼ að Þ
FB proj ¼ g Time ¼ t 1,Age ¼ a 1ð Þ  1:13t2018
FB Users ¼ g Time ¼ t, Age ¼ að Þ
¼ min upper bound, FB projð Þ
In both cases, our true target is
y ¼
Z 100
13
Z 2100
2018
f ðAge, TimeÞgðAge, TimeÞd ðAgeÞd ðTimeÞ
For the mortality rate model f, we used beta regres-
sion with a logit link function, a common choice for
rate data. For the Facebook model g, we used negative
binomial regression with a log link function, which is
well suited for over-dispersed counts such as those
observed in this dataset. We experimented with several
alternatives for the population model h, ultimately get-
ting the best results using Gaussian regression with a
log link function. Parametric specifications for each
model were evaluated using the Akaike information
criterion (Akaike, 1974), a penalized likelihood meas-
ure. Age and time were incorporated as both main
effects and interacting variables in models f and h,
which were fit with tensor product interactions in a
functional ANOVA structure (Wood, 2006). We use
cubic regression splines for all smooths, with a max-
imum basis dimension of 10. Parameters were estimated
using generalized cross-validation.
Uncertainty
While there remains no good way to evaluate the pre-
cision of the underlying data – as noted above, neither
the UN nor Facebook provides confidence intervals –
we may quantify the uncertainty of the model using
nonparametric techniques. GAMs provide straightfor-
ward standard errors for their predictions, but under
both scenarios our true target y is a double integral of a
product of two vectors. Unfortunately, there is no
analytic method for calculating y’s variance as a func-
tion of those variables without making strong assump-
tions that almost certainly fail in this case.
For that reason, we measure uncertainty using a
Bayesian bootstrap (Rubin, 1981). To implement this
algorithm, we sample n weights from a flat Dirichlet
prior and fit the models using these random weights.
We repeat this procedure 500 times for each country
and scenario, providing an approximate posterior dis-
tribution for all predictions, from which we compute
standard errors. These numbers are reported in par-
entheses next to point estimates in the text, and in
their own column in all table summaries.
Findings
As previously noted, the findings we present in this
paper concern only the future accumulation of dead
profiles (i.e., those who will die between 2018 and
2100). Naturally, many users have already left profiles
behind when they passed away. This number, however,
is unknown, but should (whatever it is) be added to the
plots we present in Scenarios A and B below.
Scenario A
Our first scenario assumes that users will cease joining
the network as of 2018. While unlikely, this defines the
minimum of the possible development, what we refer to
as the floor (see Figure 2). Attached to the plot is a
table with the exact numbers and share of each contin-
ent (Table 1).
Under the assumptions of Scenario A, we estimate
that some 1.4 billion (11.15 million) Facebook users
will die between 2018 and 2100 – fully 98% of the 1.43
billion users in our dataset. Under this scenario, the
number of deaths per year on Facebook grows steadily
for the next five decades, peaking at over 29 million
(0.31 million) in 2077 before decelerating through
the rest of the century. The global sum of dead pro-
files exceeds 500 million (3.86 million) in 2060 and
1 billion (8.67 million) in 2079. Note that under
these conservative assumptions, the dead will in
fact overtake the living on Facebook in about
50 years. This corroborates popular claims in media
(Ambrosino, 2015; Brown, 2013) about living profiles
becoming a minority on the network within the (rela-
tively) near future.
The plot further shows that Asia contains a growing
plurality of deceased users for every year in the dataset,
culminating with nearly 44% of the total by the end of
the century. Nearly half of those profiles come from
just two countries, India and Indonesia, which account
for a cumulative 278.8 million (9.8 million) Facebook
mortalities by 2100 (see Table 2).
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Scenario B
Scenario A is highly unlikely. For Facebook to see zero
global growth as of 2019 would require some cataclys-
mic event(s) far more ruinous than the Cambridge
Analytica scandal (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison,
2018), which revealed serious issues regarding the secur-
ity and privacy of Facebook user data. To estimate how
much higher the growth can possibly be, the second
scenario sets a ‘ceiling’ on the development. We pre-
sume that Facebook will continue to see global
growth of 13% per year until it reaches 100% penetra-
tion in all markets. As illustrated by Figure 3, this
assumption drastically changes the total number of
dead users by the end of the century.
A continuous growth rate of 13% per year
increases the expected number of dead profiles on
Facebook by a factor of 3.5, for a total sum of 4.9 bil-
lion (97.23 million). Unlike Scenario A, the dead
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Figure 2. Accumulation of dead profiles under Scenario A.
Table 2. Geographical distribution of dead profiles (in millions)
by country under Scenario A. Results for top ten countries
shown.
Time Country Profiles SE Percent
2100 India 207.6545 8.3233 14.8527
2100 United States 115.7516 2.0561 8.2793
2100 Indonesia 71.1468 5.2658 5.0889
2100 Brazil 65.3675 3.3203 4.6755
2100 Mexico 42.9421 1.0875 3.0715
2100 Philippines 34.6779 0.7469 2.4804
2100 United Kingdom 31.7917 0.3797 2.2739
2100 France 29.7236 0.2221 2.1260
2100 Thailand 28.9506 0.8205 2.0707
2100 Vietnam 28.5697 0.6811 2.0435
2100 Rest of World 741.5138 2.3780 53.0376
Table 1. Geographical distribution of dead profiles (in millions)
under Scenario A.
Time Continent Profiles SE Percentage
2100 Africa 137.3577 1.0876 9.8273
2100 Asia 609.7714 10.1823 43.6261
2100 Europe 254.3236 1.1467 18.1956
2100 North America 206.9839 2.3485 14.8087
2100 Oceania 18.1326 0.1467 1.2973
2100 South America 171.1529 3.3918 12.2451
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profiles do not show any signs of exceeding the living
within this century. However, the proportion is still
substantial, and the dead are likely to reach parity with
the living in the first decades of the 22nd century.
A continuous 13% growth rate would change not just
the total number of dead users, but their geographical
distribution (see Tables 3 and 4). The most notable shift
is the considerably increased share of global Facebook
mortalities contributed by African nations. Nigeria in
particular becomes a major hub of Facebook user
deaths under Scenario B – in fact, the second largest
in the world, accounting for over 6% of the global
total. The shift is evident in Figures 3 and 4. Niger,
Mali and Burkina Faso also appear in the top 10 coun-
tries by dead profile count, while the United States is the
only Western nation to crack the list. In other words, a
minority of dead profiles will belong to Western users.
To illustrate the geographical distribution more
clearly, we have included a heatmap that visualizes
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
D
ea
d 
Pr
of
ile
s 
(M
illi
on
s) Continent
Asia
Africa
Europe
South America
North America
Oceania
Global Accumulation of Dead Profiles:
Scenario B
Figure 3. Accumulation of dead profiles under Scenario B.
Table 4. Geographical distribution of dead profiles (in millions)
by country under Scenario B. Results for top ten countries
shown.
Time Country Profiles SE Percent
2100 India 783.7010 30.6525 15.9852
2100 Nigeria 315.5320 39.8116 6.4359
2100 Indonesia 221.0466 21.1954 4.5087
2100 Pakistan 177.0034 3.3463 3.6104
2100 Brazil 144.7937 31.7306 2.9534
2100 Niger 126.7529 29.0875 2.5854
2100 United States 112.4368 28.9811 2.2934
2100 Philippines 102.4860 2.8522 2.0904
2100 Mali 100.0100 17.3816 2.0399
2100 Burkina Faso 93.5536 26.9056 1.9082
2100 Rest of World 2725.3420 56.1275 55.5891
Table 3. Geographical distribution of dead profiles (in millions)
under Scenario B.
Time Continent Profiles SE Percentage
2100 Africa 1786.4705 73.2377 36.4435
2100 Asia 2039.0000 40.5229 41.5951
2100 Europe 414.7771 9.3840 8.4613
2100 North America 283.6859 33.2734 5.7871
2100 Oceania 33.6563 1.1270 0.6866
2100 South America 344.4356 31.8269 7.0264
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deceased Facebook users per country (see Figure 4).
Unsurprisingly, the map closely tracks the list of largest
Facebook markets. However, it should be noted that
only two Western countries (the US and the UK) make
it to the top 10 list under either scenario. Thus, the
maps clearly show that death online is a global phe-
nomenon, reaching far wider than just Europe and
America.
To summarize, both scenarios are implausible. The
true number almost certainly falls somewhere between
Scenarios A and B, but we can only speculate as to
where. Assumptions regarding growth rates have a
major impact on both absolute numbers and geograph-
ical distributions of dead profiles. While richer data
sources may help produce more accurate projections,
an exact estimate is almost beside the point. Even in the
conservative Scenario A, numbers are large. Facebook
will indubitably have hundreds of millions of dead users
by 2060 if not sooner.
With regards to the geographical distribution, it can
be noted that in both scenarios, a handful of countries
make up a large proportion of the total – mainly India
(due to its large population) and the US (due to its high
penetration rates), but also other countries like Nigeria
and Brazil will be important stakeholders in this devel-
opment. Next, we turn to a discussion of the challenges
posed by the growth of death online.
Discussion
Our projection of growth in dead Facebook users’
accounts marks the first step toward empirically explor-
ing the macroscopic and quantitative aspects of death
on social media. The results should be interpreted not
as a prediction of the future, but as a commentary
on the present, and an opportunity to respond with
thoughtful and effective policy interventions.
Undoubtedly, there is a great deal of uncertainty
in projections of this kind. In addition to the predic-
tive variance discussed above, there is also uncer-
tainty regarding the data underlying the model. For
instance, we do not know if there will be a significant
cultural shift among users towards deleting profiles
(either one’s own or deceased relatives’, a possibility
given to the appointed legacy contact). It is also pos-
sible that Facebook will unexpectedly go bankrupt in
the foreseeable future, thus invalidating the assump-
tions underlying our models. As stressed by boyd
(2006) among others, the longevity of social media
sites depends on their ability to evolve, and despite
the success of the past decade, we do not yet know
how or if Facebook will manage to do this in the
future.
But this has no bearing on our larger point – namely,
that critical discussion of online death and its macro-
scopic implications is urgently needed (not least in
regard to its geographical spread). Facebook is merely
an example of what awaits any platform with similar
connectivity and global reach. Furthermore, the sudden
dissolution of Facebook would arguably make the sub-
ject even more important, as the company may be
forced to sell or delete their user data. A sufficiently
severe blow to Facebook’s finances could force a rede-
sign of the platform with major implications for those
currently using it as a memorial site (see, for instance,
Arnold et al., 2018: 202 on how the relaunch of
MySpace 2013 dropped features used by mourners).
In what follows, we tentatively presume that
Facebook or something like it will continue to exist
for the foreseeable future.
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Figure 4. Heat map visualizing the global distribution of deceased Facebook user profiles under Scenarios A and B. Numbers are
plotted on a logarithmic scale. Countries and regions with no Facebook data or fewer than 10,000 monthly active users were not
included in our models and are rendered in grey.
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Each individual who leaves a profile behind repre-
sents a unique event in its own right, which often
leaves us with difficult questions of inheritance of digital
assets (Banta et al., 2015; Craig et al., 2013) and post-
humous online privacy (Harbinja, 2014). But when
aggregated, the totality of these cases amounts to some-
thing beyond the sum of its parts. The personal digital
heritage left by the online dead are, or will at least
become, part of our shared cultural digital heritage
(Cameron and Kenderdine, 2007), which may prove
invaluable not only to future historians (Bru¨gger and
Schroeder, 2017; Pitsillides et al., 2012; Roland and
Bawden, 2012), but to future generations as part of
their record and self-understanding. As stated by Matt
Raymond, the former director of communications at the
American Library of Congress upon receiving a large
data donation from Twitter, ‘Individually tweets might
seem insignificant, but viewed in the aggregate, they can
be a resource for future generations to understand life in
the 21st century’ (Raymond, 2010). Such records can
thus be thought of as a form of future public good
(Waters, 2002: 83), without which we risk falling into
a ‘digital dark age’ (Kuny, 1998; Smit et al., 2011).
Despite its seeming immortality, digital information
is more fragile than is sometimes assumed, and future
access is far from guaranteed (Whitt, 2017) – even for
Facebook itself. File formats change, hardware must be
updated, and data need to be continuously stewarded
and organized in order to remain useful. As Jeff
Rothenberg (1995) says, ‘Digital information lasts for-
ever – or five years, whichever comes first.’ This is not
primarily due to storage costs. ‘The real cost of stor-
age’, as Palm (2006: 5) puts it, ‘is management.’ To
maintain data utility, firms must routinely upgrade sys-
tems and tend to their contents, a costly and tedious
undertaking for which Facebook’s current curation
model was not designed. Lavoie and Dempsey (2004:
229) put it well:
Preserving our digital heritage is more than just a tech-
nical process of perpetuating digital signals over long
periods of time. It is also a social and cultural process,
in the sense of selecting what materials should be pre-
served, and in what form; it is an economic process, in
the sense of matching limited means with ambitious
objectives; it is a legal process, in the sense of defining
what rights and privileges are needed to support main-
tenance of a permanent scholarship and cultural
record . . .And perhaps most importantly, it is an
ongoing, long-term commitment, often shared, and
cooperatively met, by many stakeholders.
While Lavoie and Dempsey write primarily for an audi-
ence of librarians and archivists, their argument is
equally applicable to the case of digital remains on
Facebook: the cultural/ethical process of selecting
whose data are worth preserving, and how to preserve
them, is inseparable from the economic constraints that
induce the question. But how is one to determine what is
worth preserving? This requires a normative framework,
one or several guiding principles that help us determine
the value of data. There aremany possible candidates for
such a principle. An object can be appreciated for its
sentimental, scientific, religious, or aesthetic values, to
list just a few considerations of note. Furthermore, it is
plausible that different regions, nations and other inter-
est groups will appreciate different values in Facebook’s
mounting historical record. Nevertheless, it is neither
users nor their political representatives or religious
groupswho determine how their data is collectivelyman-
aged – it is the corporate interests of Facebook.
For a firm, what makes data ‘worth preserving’ is
ultimately their ability to directly or indirectly contrib-
ute to the company’s profit. Data belonging to deceased
users may prove valuable for such purposes. For exam-
ple, the memorialized profiles may still serve the func-
tion of attracting living users who visit the profile to
mourn (Karppi, 2013). Indeed, time spent on Facebook
can even be understood as a type of labour (Fuchs and
Sevignani, 2013). While the (indirect) traffic generated
by mourning relatives may not single-handedly result in
enough clicks and exposure to cover the costs of curat-
ing the dead, it could still serve the indirect function of
appropriating central social functions such as mourning
and love (O¨hman and Floridi, 2017). What is more,
datasets of digital remains may also be used for training
new models (Leaver, 2013) and extracting historical
insight, which may provide a valuable market advan-
tage. Few legal obstacles stand in the way of such
experimentation, as deceased users are not, at least
according to current legislation, protected the way
living users are (see, for instance, the latest GDPR,
which lacks any clear guidelines for handling digital
remains).
While both the traffic generated by the bereaved and
the internal training of new models are possible uses of
digital remains, they do not guarantee long-term prof-
itability. If the economic value of dead profiles were
ever to become negative, market forces would compel
a rationally self-interested firm to delete them. This
seems to be the preferred option for many other
social media including Twitter (Twitter.com, n.d.),
and is also advocated on a normative basis by some
scholars, perhaps most notably Mayer-Scho¨nberger
(2009). But thus far Facebook appears to have found
the net value of dead profiles to be positive.
This is not to say that Facebook, nor any other plat-
form, only appreciates the commercial value of digital
remains as a source of financial exploitation. In fact,
Facebook has carefully considered the ethical
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implications of their policy (Brubaker and Callison-
Burch, 2016), and has removed advertisements from
the deceased profiles, thus virtually de-commercializing
the space. But the de-commercialization itself may be
interpreted as a response to market incentives, in so
much as it is rational for firms to maintain the good
will of their customers. Curating a deceased relative’s
profile could keep some users on the platform, even if it
is not the main source of revenue generated by them.
Market incentives may often overlap with the inter-
ests of researchers, consumers and future generations –
but they are by no means identical. Markets have been
discussed rather extensively in the digital preservation
literature. For instance, Lavoie (2003: 15) identifies
three ideal type-roles in the economics of digital pres-
ervation: Right holder, Archive and Beneficiary.
Sometimes, these roles are played by a single entity,
sometimes by separate ones. Lavoie stresses that in
so-called supply-side models (17), where the Right
holder and the Archive are the same entity but the
Beneficiary is external, there is a risk that the market
does not create sufficient incentives for preservation.
This is indeed a risk in the case of Facebook. The plat-
form has both the rights to the information stored and
is the archiving entity. Moreover, they have little incen-
tive to share (to say nothing of the complexity of post-
humous privacy rights). The beneficiaries – in this case
future generations and historians – can neither speak
for themselves nor create any current incentives, which
make a purely free-market model inappropriate.
This situation requires what one may call a new
macro-ethics of deletion (to borrow a term from
Floridi, 2013), a curation model that encompasses
and appreciates the various kinds of values involved.
In line with Lavoie and Dempsey’s argument, we there-
fore conclude that multiple stakeholders must be con-
sidered. These stakeholders may include states, NGOs,
universities, libraries, museums, and any other kind of
institution that provides unique perspectives on the
value of our digital heritage. The multi-stakeholder
approach is not in itself a novel proposal. Indeed, the
pioneering Task Force on Archiving of Digital
Information (1996) was composed of a collection of
individuals representing industry, museums, archives
and libraries, publishers, scholarly societies and govern-
ment. And newer initiatives, such as UNESCO’s stra-
tegic plan for software heritage (Di Cosmo and
Zacchiroli, 2017: 4), have continued to stress the
value of diversity in digital preservation:
We believe that, for Software Heritage, it is essential to
build a not-for-profit foundation that has as its explicit
objective the collection, preservation and sharing of our
software commons. In order to minimize the risk of
having a single point of failure at the institutional
level, this foundation needs to be supported by various
partners from civil society, academia, industry, and
governments, and must provide value to all areas that
may take advantage of the existence of the archive,
ranging from the preservation of cultural heritage to
research, from industry to education.
While the above quote deals mainly with software, the
same can be said about the vast datasets accumulated
by social media firms. It is important that historically
significant data are preserved in a way that serves all of
humanity, and this cannot be done by allocating the
curation of historical social records to any one agent
operating in its rational self-interest.
Finally, we wish to stress the importance of decen-
tralizing control over aggregates of digital remains.
Concentration of historical data in private hands may
prove problematic for political reasons (Lor and Britz,
2012; O¨hman, 2018). While it is true that one’s digital
remains are often distributed over multiple platforms
and media (Cann, 2014; Pitsillides et al., 2012: 19), it
seems that control of personal data (and hence digital
remains) are increasingly concentrated in a small
number of global actors (many of which are owned
by Facebook, e.g. Whatsapp, Messenger, and
Instagram). And, as Orwell so adroitly observed in
1984, those who control our access to the past also
control how we perceive the present. So, in order to
prevent a possibly dystopian future of power asymme-
tries and distorted historical narratives, the task before
us is to design a sustainable, dignified solution that takes
into account multiple stakeholders and values. This
inevitably requires a decentralization of control and
ownership of our collective digital heritage.
Academic knowledge will be key in this process.
Researchers are charged not just with providing
macro-level analyses like this one, but also with provid-
ing qualitative knowledge of how individuals in differ-
ent cultures and social settings make sense of death and
the digital. When it comes to qualitative research, there
is already a rich literature upon which to draw (Bell
et al., 2015; Brubaker et al., 2016; Kasket, 2012).
However, researchers have hitherto mainly focused on
North American and European settings – with some
exceptions (Choudhary, 2018). If the goal is to contrib-
ute to a fair and flexible system for curating digital
remains, researchers must increasingly turn to non-wes-
tern contexts, where the phenomenon is going to have
the largest presence. While survey data from previous
studies do not indicate any radical differences in atti-
tudes toward online death across cultures (Grimm and
Chiasson, 2014), a qualitative, nuanced understanding
of this fast-evolving subject is required. We therefore
encourage scholars of online death to widen the geo-
graphical scope of their research, and focus particularly
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on South Asia and Africa, where our models suggest
the phenomenon will be most prevalent in the coming
decades.
Conclusion
This study has provided the first rigorous projection of
the accumulation of Facebook profiles belonging to the
deceased. Will the dead then, ‘take over’ Facebook? We
have concluded that hundreds of millions of dead pro-
files will be added to the network in the next few dec-
ades alone, and that the dead may well outnumber the
living before the end of the century, depending on how
global user penetration rates evolve. Irrespective of how
the network grows in the years to come, the vast major-
ity of dead profiles will belong to users from non-wes-
tern countries.
Considering its global reach, we have argued that the
totality of deceased user profiles amounts to something
beyond the sum of its parts. These profiles are becom-
ing part of our collective record as a species, and may
prove invaluable to future generations. We believe that
a multi-stakeholder approach is the best way to curate
such a vast archive. We have also stressed that in craft-
ing a future curation model, qualitative understanding
of how different cultures make sense of death and the
digital will be key. Likewise, the development poses
difficult ethical problems that require careful consider-
ation. The onus is now on policymakers and industry to
rise to these challenges. We look forward to taking part
in the debates to come.
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Notes
1. Users are also encouraged to select a ‘legacy contact’ that
will steward the account upon their death.
2. For the record, it should be noted that while Facebook is
popular in most countries, it faces considerable competi-
tion from for example VKontakte in Russia, and is
almost completely absent in other places (China, North
Korea, etc.). This, however, is not our main concern.
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